We present translations from a logic with indexed lax modalities to first-order intuitionistic logic and intuitionistic linear logic. These translations rely on a continuation passing style encoding for the lax modalities. We show that our translations preserve provability of formulas.
Introduction
Lax logic is a modal logic extending intuitionistic propositional logic with a single modality lax ( A) satisfying the following axioms.
In this report we describe two simple translations of lax logic with multiple modalities: a first-order translation into first-order intuitionistic logic and a linear translation into intuitionistic linear logic. We show that our translations preserve provability. The essence of these translations is a continuation passing style (CPS) encoding of the lax modality.
Background. In its propositional form, lax logic was introduced by Mendler et al [FM97] as a means of modeling digital circuits. Subsequently, a first-order version was developed for use in constraint logic programming [FW97, FMW97] . The semantics and proof theory of lax logic are well studied [PD01, FM97, How01, BBdP98, GP06, AMdPR01] and the propositional fragment is decidable [FM97, How01] . Lax logic corresponds (under the Curry-Howard isomorphism) to monads from functional programming [BBdP98] .
Our primary interest in lax logic is its application to representing decentralized access-control systems where different users, machines, programs, etc (abstractly called principals) request access to secure resources like files or devices under the control of other principals such as administrators or the operating system. The policies governing access to resources are formalized as logical formulas in a suitably chosen logic. Access is granted to a resource if a particular proposition such as can read(Bob, foo.pdf) is provable in the logic from the given policy.
A quintessential requirement on a logic of access control is a notion of statements made by a principal [ABLP93, LABW92] . For instance, we may want to formalize the following statements in the access control policy of a file system: -Administrator says Bob can read foo.pdf -Administrator says that any user X can read foo.pdf if X is a member of the group of privileged users One convenient way of formalizing such statements is to introduce for each principal K, a modality K A (read "K says A") with the intended meaning that K says that A is true. Then the above statements can be encoded as follows.
-administrator can read(Bob, foo.pdf)
-administrator (∀X. privileged(X) ⊃ can read(X, food.pdf)).
Here privileged(X) is a predicate indicating that X is a privileged user and can read(Bob, foo.pdf) means that Bob is allowed to read foo.pdf.
There is reasonable flexibility in choosing the logical rules governing the modality K A and a number of proposals have been made [LABW92, ABLP93, Aba03, GP06, Aba06] . For instance the 2 operator from modal logic K can be used. However, more recently, an increasingly large number translations preserve equality of proofs under βη-reduction. We show that CPS translations of lax modalities also preserve the existence of proofs. This expands earlier results from the level of proof terms to the level of provability. The correctness of our linear translation critically uses the fact that continuations arising from the translation have to be used exactly once. This is well understood in functional programming [DDP99, BORT02, Ber04] .
There is rather limited work on translating logics for access control into simpler logics. We are aware of only one substantial effort in this direction [GA08] . However, this work is targeted at modal S4 rather than intuitionistic logic. Other previous work on translating lax logic has targeted intuitionistic S4 [PD01] .
Organization of the Report. Section 2 describes the syntax and proof-system of the access control logic INLL. Section 3 describes the translation from INLL to first-order logic. In section 4 we modify this translation to obtain the linear translation. Section 5 concludes the report with directions for future work.
INLL: Indexed Lax Logic
In this section we describe indexed lax logic INLL, which is the source of our translations. INLL extends intuitionistic propositional logic with a number of lax modalities, indexed by elements of a countable domain of principals. We use A, B to denote arbitrary formulas and P to denote atomic formulas. The letter K ranges over principals.
The axioms governing the lax modalities K A have been described in section 1. Both natural deduction and sequent calculus presentations of the proof theory are known for this logic [PD01, FM97, How01, BBdP98] . In the following we describe a cut free sequent calculus from an earlier work by one of the authors [GP06] to an extent necessitated by further discussion. Details of the proof theory may be found in earlier papers.
The sequent calculus for INLL is presented in judgmental style, where the subjects of knowledge are statements about propositions called categorical judgments. We use two categorical judgments: A true, meaning that proposition A is true, and K affirms A meaning that principal K states that A is true. Based on these categorical judgments, we construct hypothetical judgments which are the subjects of proofs. Hypothetical judgments take one of the following two forms:
The judgments A 1 true, . . . , A n true are called hypotheses or assumptions, and the intended meaning is that if these judgments hold, then the judgment to the right of ⇒ (B true or K affirms B) holds. We use the symbol Γ to denote a set of hypothesis, and γ to denote the judgment on the right of ⇒ when its exact form does not matter. We elide the judgment name true from A true.
Connectives are described in the sequent calculus using left and right rules. As an example, the rules for implication ⊃ are:
Rules for the connectives ∧, ∨, , ⊥ are standard, and may be found in Appendix A. The rules for K A are:
The first rule states that in order to establish that K A is true, it is enough to establish that K affirms A. The second rule states that if we assume that K A is true, then we are justified in assuming that A is true provided we are trying to prove a goal of the form K affirms C. Note the accordance of principal K on the left and right of ⇒ in this rule. The final rule connects the two basic judgments:
This rule states that if A is true, then it is also the case that K affirms A. Together these three rules capture the lax nature of the modality K A. Appendix A summarizes the sequent calculus. It can be shown that this sequent calculus is equivalent to the three axioms described earlier, and that in the degenerate case where we consider only one principal, this logic reduces to lax logic. The following cut admissibility theorem was proved in [GP06].
Theorem 2.1 (Admissibility of Cut).
Translation to First-Order Intuitionistic Logic
Now we present the translation from INLL to first-order intuitionistic logic (FOIL). The syntax and proof theory of intuitionistic first-order logic are standard. A cut free sequent calculus is summarized in appendix B. We write Σ; Γ ⇒ A to mean that from assumptions Γ, A is provable in FOIL. The set Σ records all first-order constants occurring in Γ and A. Our translation ( · ) is described in Figure 1 . It maps all intuitionistic connectives of INLL to themselves. The core of our work is the translation of K A. We assume the existence of a binary predicate af (K, x), which does not occur in INLL formulas. Its first argument is a principal. The second is assumed to have an arbitrary fixed type. We often call the second argument a nonce. We define
This resembles a CPS transformation of the lax modality. The formula A ⊃ af (K, x) is the "type" of the continuation, and af (K, x) is type of the result. It is necessary to universally quantify over the nonce x in order to preserve provability. Figure 1 also shows the translation of hypotheses Γ and sequents. The non-trivial part is the translation of the sequent Γ ⇒ K affirms A, which is defined as Σ, a; Γ , ( A ⊃ af (K, a)) ⇒ af (K, a) where a is a fresh constant. We prove two complementary correctness theorems for the translation. Completeness states that whenever a formula is provable in INLL, its translation is provable in FOIL. The dual theorem, soundness, states the converse. Completeness is easy to establish. We only need to show that each
Σ contains all constants mentioned in Γ, A and K. . Suppose Σ contains all first-order constants mentioned in Γ, A and K.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Soundness states that if Γ ⇒ A in FOIL, then Γ ⇒ A in INLL. Establishing this theorem is non-trivial. Our approach is to identify a syntactic class of FOIL sequents which can occur in proofs of translated INLL sequents. Then we define an inverse translation ( · ) from this class of sequents to INLL, such that · is the identity. Finally we induct on proofs of sequents in this class to show that their inverse translation is provable in INLL. The formal soundness theorem is shown below.
Theorem 3.2 (Soundness).
Suppose Σ contains all first-order constants mentioned in Γ, A and K.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Importance of Nonces. The universally quantified nonce x in the translated formula ∀x.( A ⊃ af (K, x)) ⊃ af (K, x) is essential for the proof of soundness. A translation without the nonce is unsound. We show this by means of a counterexample. Suppose that we omit the nonce, so that af is a unary predicate expecting only one principal as argument and define
It is quite easy to verify that this formula is not provable in general in INLL. However its translation is provable in FOIL for any A, B and K, as the following derivation shows.
In each application of the ⊃ L rule, we have put the principal formula in a box . This proof uses the continuation A ⊃ af (K) twice: once in the rule marked * and then in the rule marked * * .
If we used a universally quantified nonce in the predicate af (K, x), this proof would be invalid because the goal af (K) generated from K B (rule marked +) would contain a fresh nonce that would not match the nonce in the continuation.
Translation to Intuitionistic Linear Logic
The counterexample at the end of section 3 demonstrates that the nonce x is essential in the firstorder translation. We now describe an alternate possibility. Instead of adding the nonce, we could make the continuation ( A ⊃ af (K)) linear forcing it to be used exactly once in the proof. The rule marked * would consume the continuation, making it unavailable in the rule marked * * . This would invalidate the proof and eliminate the need for a first-order quantifier. Formally, we translate INLL to propositional intuitionistic linear logic (ILL) instead of first-order intuitionistic logic. There are several presentations of intuitionistic linear logic [dPH93, CCP03, Wad93, Bar96]. We use a two-context presentation [CCP03, Bar96] . Appendix C summarizes the syntax and semantics of ILL. The judgment Γ; ∆ ⇒ A means that under the linear assumptions ∆ and unrestricted assumptions Γ, A can be established. The assumptions in ∆ must each be used exactly once. Those in Γ may be used zero or more times. We use the symbol for linear implication, and ⊃ for non-linear implication. One may think of A ⊃ B as being (!A)
B. The other connectives we need are & (additive conjunction), ⊕ (additive disjunction), and 0.
Our linear translation ( · ) is described in Figure 2 . For intuitionistic connectives, our translation mirrors Girard's translation from intuitionistic logic to linear logic [Gir87]. For translating K B, we assume a unary predicate af (K) whose argument is a principal and define
Observe the use of in the translation. For sequents, the interesting part is the translation of Γ ⇒ K affirms A, where the continuation ( A ⊃ af (K)) is a linear assumption. It is instructive to check that by making the translation linear in this manner, the counterexample at the end of section 3 no longer holds.
Correctness of the translation is established by proving soundness and completeness. It is straightforward to establish completeness by showing that each proof in INLL can be simulated in ILL. 
If
Proof. See Appendix F.
Soundness is harder, but can be established using methods similar to section 3. 
Γ ; · ⇒ A in ILL, then Γ ⇒ A in INLL 2. If Γ ; A ⊃ af (K) ⇒ af (K) in ILL, then Γ ⇒ K affirms A in INLL Proof. See Appendix G.
Conclusion
We have presented translations of propositional indexed lax logic to first-order intuitionistic logic and intuitionistic linear logic, and showed that they preserve provability. The essence of our translations is a CPS encoding of lax modalities. We conclude this report with a discussion of extensions and future work.
First-order and linear extensions. INLL is a propositional logic. Our translations can be extended to extensions of INLL with first-order universal and existential quantifiers, including those over principals, by mapping these quantifiers to themselves. In the case of the linear translation this requires corresponding connectives in the target linear logic. For the first-order case, one must also assume that the type of nonces is fresh, i.e., nonces do not appear in INLL formulas.
It is also possible to translate a linear logic with indexed lax modalities to linear logic without any modalities. In this case, every linear connective is mapped to itself, and K A is mapped to ( A af (K)) af (K). This is interesting because applications of linear logic in access control have been studied recently [GBB + 06, BBG + 07].
Future Work. An immediate subject of future work is to actually use our translations for theorem proving in access control systems. We would like to see if this idea scales to large access control policies that are used in practice.
On a more theoretical note, we would like to use our translation to explore Kripke semantics for lax logic. Since Kripke semantics of first-order logic are well understood, we should be able to derive semantics for lax logic using the translation. It would be interesting to explore how these relate to existing Kripke semantics [FM97, AMdPR01, GA08], and whether these derived semantics have some practical application in the context of access control.
In a related direction, it is possible to obtain translations from lax logic into first-order intuitionistic logic by taking existing Kripke semantics and encoding their accessibility relations as explicit predicates. It would be interesting to see if these translations relate to ours in a meaningful way.
[ 
A INLL
INLL has all the inference rules of intuitionistic propositional logic:
To these we add inference rules mirroring the left rules of intuitionistic propositional logic:
Finally, we add rules connecting the two judgment forms:
C Linear Logic
The syntax of intuitionistic propositional linear logic follows:
where ranges P over atomic propositions. To express truth, the judgment form B true is needed. The sequent form Γ; ∆ ⇒ B true expresses hypothetical judgments. It means that under the unrestricted assumptions Γ and the restricted (linear) assumptions ∆, B is true. The two contexts have the following form:
The inference rules of the logic are as follows.
Judgmental Rules
Γ; P ⇒ P true init Γ, A; ∆, A ⇒ C true Γ, A; ∆ ⇒ C true copy Multiplicative Connectives Γ; ∆ 1 ⇒ A true Γ; ∆ 2 ⇒ B true Γ; ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ⇒ A ⊗ B true ⊗ R Γ; ∆, A, B ⇒ C true Γ; ∆, A ⊗ B ⇒ C true ⊗ L Γ; · ⇒ 1 true 1R Γ; ∆ ⇒ C true Γ; ∆, 1 ⇒ C true 1L Γ; ∆, A ⇒ B true Γ; ∆ ⇒ A B true R Γ; ∆ 1 ⇒ A true Γ; ∆ 2 , B ⇒ C true Γ; ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , A B ⇒ C true L Γ, A; ∆ ⇒ B true Γ; ∆ ⇒ A ⊃ B true ⊃ R Γ; · ⇒ A true Γ; ∆, B ⇒ C true Γ; ∆, A ⊃ B ⇒ C true ⊃ L Additive Connectives Γ; ∆ ⇒ A true Γ; ∆ ⇒ B true Γ; ∆ ⇒ A & B true & R Γ; ∆, A ⇒ C true Γ; ∆, A & B ⇒ C true & L 1 Γ; ∆, B ⇒ C true Γ; ∆, A & B ⇒ C true & L 2 Γ; ∆ ⇒ true R no L rule Γ; ∆ ⇒ A true Γ; ∆ ⇒ A ⊕ B true ⊕ R 1 Γ; ∆ ⇒ B true Γ; ∆ ⇒ A ⊕ B true ⊕ R 2 Γ; ∆, A ⇒ C true Γ; ∆, B ⇒ C true Γ; ∆, A ⊕ B ⇒ C true ⊕ L Γ; ∆, 0 ⇒ C true 0L Exponential Connective Γ; · ⇒ A true Γ; · ⇒ !A true !R Γ, A; ∆ ⇒ C true Γ; ∆, !A ⇒ C true !L
D Proof of Completeness for First-Order Translation
Before proving completeness, we must prove a lemma.
Lemma D.1. [t/x]A = [t/x]
A where t ranges over terms.
Proof. By induction on the structure of A.
Now we prove completeness. By the definition of Σ, Γ ⇒ γ , this may be shown by proving 1. if Σ; Γ ⇒ C, then Σ; Γ ⇒ C ; and 2. if Σ; Γ ⇒ K affirms C, then for any fresh a, Σ, a; Γ , C ⊃ af (K, a) ⇒ af (K, a).
We prove these statements by simultaneous induction over the derivations D of Σ; Γ ⇒ A or Σ; Γ ⇒ K affirms C: 
by definition of ·
E Proof of Soundness for First-Order Translation E.1 A Lemma
Before we can prove soundness, we need to define a few forms in which various terms may be found. We define these forms to focus our attention on only those formulas that can arise from proving a the translated sequent.
• Let the proposition D be called (K, t)-nice if it has the form C ,
• Let the proposition A be called (K, t)-mean if it has the form af (
• Let a hypothesis context Γ be called pleasant if Γ is empty or Γ has the form Γ , E for some proposition E where Γ is pleasant and E has the form C ,
Pleasant is more formally defined in Table 1 .
There exists a derivation D of Σ; Γ ⇒ D that is a shorter or equal in length to D.
Proof. Now we simultaneously induct on the given derivation D for all values of K and t.
Thus, ⊥ must be in Γ and Σ; Γ ⇒ D follows in one step by ⊥R.
Case: ⊃R
is (K, t)-nice, and A is (K, t)-mean. Thus, the i.h. applies to D 1 . By the i.h. on D 1 , Σ; Γ, C ⊃ af (K, t) ⇒ af (K, t) has a derivation D 1 with a length less than or equal to that of
Since D is one step longer than D 1 , D 1 is equal to or less than D 1 in length, and D is one step longer than D 1 , D is equal to or less than D in length.
has a derivation D 1 with a length no greater than that of D 1 . Make D by extending D 1 with ⊃R to prove Σ; Γ ⇒ C ⊃ af (K, t) in no more steps than D.
By the i.h. on D 1 , Σ; Γ, E ⇒ F has a derivation D 1 with a length no greater than that of D 1 . Make D by extending D 1 with ⊃R to prove Σ; Γ ⇒ E ⊃ F in no more steps than D.
Case: When ⊃L is the last rule in D, either A can be principal or not.
Subcase: A is principal. In this case, A has the form B ⊃ af
with a length no greater than that of D 1 . Since D 2 is no greater in size than D 2 and af (K , t ) is (K, t)-mean, we may select af (K , t ) as A and again apply the i.h. This yields that Σ; Γ ⇒ D has a derivation of D 2 with a size no greater than that of D 2 . Since D 2 must also be no larger than D 2 , which is smaller than D, we are done.
Subcase: A is not principal. In this case the principal formula must be in Γ. Since Γ is pleasant and the principal formula is an implication, it must have one the following forms:
First, we consider when the principal formula has one of the first two forms. Second, we consider when it has the last form.
Subsubcase: Let B range over F and af (K , t ). Subsubcase: The only remaining case is when principal formula has the form ( E ⊃ af (K , t )) ⊃ af (K , t ). This means that D has the form
where
We now consider two cases:
We may use the i.h. on D 2 to delete A and produce a derivation
is the needed derivation D in the required length.
Thus, we may use the i.h. with K and t instead of K and t on D 1 to produce a derivation D 1 of Σ; Γ, ( E ⊃ af (K , t )) ⊃ af (K , t ) ⇒ E ⊃ af (K , t ) with a length no greater than that of D 1 . We may use the i.h. with K and t on D 2 to produce a derivation Case: When ∀L is the last rule applied in D, the principal formula cannot be A since A is (K, t)-mean. Thus, it must be in Γ. Since Γ is pleasant, the principal formula must have one of the following forms: Case: ∀R is the last rule in D. In this case D must have the form K C or ∀x. C since D is (K, t)-nice.
Note that a is fresh and does not equal t, and that K C is ∀x. ) has a derivation D 1 with a length no greater than that of
)-mean and a is fresh and not in
, which is Σ; Γ ⇒ K C , in no more steps than D. 
E.2 More Definitions
To prove soundness, we will prove a stronger statement of formulas of a certain form. A sequent Σ; Γ ⇒ γ is regular iff one of the following sets of conditions hold: Let the inverse translation A be defined by Table 2 and Γ, A = Γ , A and · = ·. Note that A = A for all propositions A of INLL.
If the hypothesis context Γ is pleasant, then every formula in Γ has the form C , af (K, t), C ⊃ af (K, t), or ( C ⊃ af (K, t)) ⊃ af (K, t). Let Γ↓ denote Γ restricted to only those formulas of the form C . Let Γ↑ denote those formulas of the remaining three forms. So Γ = Γ↓, Γ↑. 
E.3 The Theorem
Soundness is corollary to the following theorem.
No B exists such that B is equal to ∀x. C = ∀x.C . Thus, we need not further consider this case.
is (K , t )-mean and A is (K , t )-nice for any K = K and t = a. Thus, Σ; Γ , K C ⇒ A has a derivation D 1 that is shorter than or equal to D 1 in length by Lemma E.1. We may use i.h. (i) on
Case: E ends with ∀L.
∀x. C cannot be in Γ since Γ is regular and no B exists such that B is equal to ∀x. C . Thus, we need not further consider this case.
Subcase: E is
Now we consider the following cases: ) has a derivation E 1 that is shorter than or equal to E 1 in length by Lemma E.1. By h.i. (ii) on E 1 , we prove Γ, K C ⇒ K affirms D. Subsubcase K = K and t = a.
Case: E ends with ⊃R. This cannot happen since af (K, a) is not an implication. We need not further consider this case. Since no formula can contain every term t, every formula in Γ↑ is (K, t)-mean for some t. Furthermore, B is (K, t)-nice for all t. Removing formulas from Γ will never result in Γ no longer being pleasant. Thus, we may use Lemma E.1 over and over again to remove every formula in Γ↑ from the hypothesis context starting on D 1 . This results in a derivation D 1 of Σ, a; Γ↓, B ⊃ C ⇒ B with a length no greater than that of D 1 . Since Γ↓ has only formula of the form E , we can use i.h. Subcase: E = F 1 F 2 Σ, a; Γ, ( C ⊃ af (K, a)) ⊃ af (K, a), D ⊃ af (K, a) ⇒ af (K, a) ⊃ L where 
F Proof of Completeness for Linear Translation
We first construct a natural deduction system for INLL. This is provably equivalent to the sequent calculus of Section A. The proof is relatively straightforward and we omit it here. The basic hypothetical judgments has the form Γ γ where γ = A or γ = K affirms A. The system is shown in Figure 3 . 
